




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
SIX SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

SECOND EDITION.



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PREFACE.

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IN this little treatise we have tried to place before our readers an account of the various schools of Indian philosophy. In our analysis of the doctrines of some of the schools we have principally drawn upon Colebrooke's splendid work. We have also appended English translations of two most important treatises on Sāṅkhya and Nyaya systems by two well-known European scholars. This brochure is not intended for scholars but for general readers who do not find time to go through numerous works on Hindu philosophy.

CONTENTS.

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	PAGE.
Introduction	I
The Sankhya system	5
Yoga	19
Nyaya and Vaisesika	25
Purva Mimansa	45
The Vedanta	60
Charvakas	86
Maheswaras and Pasupatas	87
Pancharatras	89
Sankhyakarika	91
Tarka-Samgraha	101

DARSHANA

OR

SIX SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION.

THE Upanishads reveal the struggle of the Hindu mind to reach the comprehension of one Supreme Being; the germs of this attempt are also to be seen here and there in the hymns of the Vedas. In the Upanishads this belief in one Supreme Being has been established and at the same time the inability of the human mind to comprehend its essence has been recognized. It has been clearly proved there that the man belongs both to the perishable world around him and to the

for a long time past, have been most popular in India.

A different philosophical system which is both heterodox and orthodox is the Sāṅkhya. Kapila, the author of this system of philosophy, sets up a primordial matter as the basis of the universe out of which the latter is evolved by successive stages. Connected with the Sāṅkhya system is the Yoga system of Patañjali. The latter is evidently a development of the former. Kapila chiefly dealt with the creation of the universe and did not pay any attention to proving the existence of the Supreme Being. Yoga system, however, supplements what is not found in the Sāṅkhya system. The word Yoga means 'union with the Supreme Being', absorption therein by virtue of meditation.

The orthodox and heterodox character of the diverse systems may well be made out from a quotation in Vijnāna Bhikṣu's *Kapila Bhāṣya*. Though it refers directly to the practice that all the systems are alike respected and studied by the rigid adherents of the Vedas, it also gives a very 'succinct

the system of Chârvaka is the most conspicuous ; and next to it is Pâshupâta.

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CHAPTER I.

THE SA'NKHYA SYSTEM,

Definition—A system of philosophy in which precision of reckoning is observed in the enumeration of its principles is called Sânkhya ; a term which has been understood to signify numeral, agreeable to the usual acceptation of *Sânkhya*, number. Beginning with the original eternal element the Sânkhya recons up synthetically all the Tattwas. Thus its name means “synthetic enumeration.” It is thus different from Nyâya which is analytical. The former is based on synthetic process and the latter on the analytic. From the original twenty-five Tattwas the Sânkhya, by the synthetic process, builds up the entire creation. Whereas the Nyâya has the universe before it : by an analytical process it

dissects and reduces it to the primary elements.

Amar Singha, in his lexicon, defines it as a system the doctrine of which is founded in the exercise of judgment: for the word, from which it is derived, signifies reasoning or deliberation. In the Mahábhâratam there is a passage which supports this definition. "They exercise judgment (Sâmkhya) and discuss nature and other twenty-four principles and therefore are called Sâmkhyas.

Author.—The founder of this sect was Kâpila. The two other great representatives were Asuri and Panchasikha. There are various theories about who Kapila was. Gaudapâda, the commentator of Sâmkhya Kârikâ, considers him to have been a son of Brahmâ. Another commentator regards him as an incarnation of Vishnu. Bhagavat Purana, which is built upon Sâmkhya doctrines, regards him as an incarnation of Vishnu born as the son of Devahuti.

Various works.—The earliest work extant on the subject is *Sâmkhya Pravachanam*. It is a collection of *Sutras* or aphorisms in six

chapters. Its reputed author is Kapila. The only commentary, now generally resorted to by scholars on that great work, is *Kapila-bhàśya* or, as is popularly called *Sàṅkhya bhàśya*. The full name of that work is *Kapila Sàṅkhya Pravachana Sàstra Bhàśya*. Its reputed author is *Vijnāna Bhikshu*, a mendicant ascetic. His other works are (1) *Sàṅkhya Sàra* or a compendium of Sàṅkhya philosophy; (2) *Yoga Vartika* or a scholia on Patanjali's *Yoga Sastra* and (3) *Brahma Mimansā Bhàśya* a commentary on a treatise on Vedānta philosophy.

Another compendious work called *Tattwa Samàsa* is also attributed to Kapila. Both the works are held in equal estimation, former being an amplification of the latter. According to the scholiasts of Kapila *Tattwa Samàsa* is the proper text of the Sàṅkhya. *Sàṅkhya Pravachana* contains only a fuller exposition. In this work there are occasional references to Panchasikha, a disciple of Kapila and this goes to prove that *Sàṅkhya Pravachanam* is a later work and cannot be attributed to Kapila.

The best text of the Sāṅkhya that is now generally resorted to by the scholars is a treatise of seventy-two verses by *Iswara Krishna* called *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. There are several commentaries of this work, the most important of which are *Sāṅkhya Bhāṣya* of Gaudapada, *Sāṅkhya Chandrikā* of Narayana Tirtha, *Tattwa Kaumudi* of Bhachaspati Misra and *Sāṅkhya Kaumudi* of Rama Krishna Bhattacharya.

Doctrine.—The main position of Kapila's philosophy is that the absolute prevention of all three sorts of pain is the highest purpose of soul. The professed design, of all the schools of the Sāṅkhya, theistical, atheistical and mythological and as well as of other Indian systems of philosophy, is to teach the means by which eternal beatitude may be attained after death, if not before it. The three sorts of pain are evils proceeding from self, from external beings or from divine causes: the first is either bodily as diseases of various sorts, or mental, as cupidity, anger and other passions: the two remaining sorts arise from external sources,—the one excited

by some mundane being, the other by the agency of a being of a superior order or produced by a fortuitious cause. Complete and perpetual exemption from every sort of evil is beatitude. Kapila and his followers assert that true knowledge only can secure this exemption. The existing means, for bringing about this deliverance, are not, in their view, satisfactory. They can partially alleviate pain but cannot accomplish absolute and final relief. The two modes are first the revealed mode or the performance of religious ceremonies laid down in the Vedas, and the second, temporal or visible mode, which refers to medicine and other remedies for bodily pain, diversion for mental pain and various other preventive measures of injury and accident. The Vedic sacrifices are considered by Kapila and his followers as harmful though not absolutely sinful. The other expedients too are not regarded by them as perfect remedies. True and perfect knowledge only is considered as the penacea for all these evils. This true and perfect knowledge consists in rightly discriminating

the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world from the sensitive and cognitive principle which is the immaterial soul. Thus the *Kàrikà* premises that "the inquiry concerns means of precluding the three sorts of pain, for pain is embarrassment. Nor is the enquiry superfluous because obvious means of liberation exist for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished. The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual: for it is impure, and it is defective in some respects as well as excessive in others. A method, different from both, is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, of the imperceptible one and of the Thinking soul. The three kinds of evidence, by which certainty is attained by mankind, are besides intuition, perception, inference and affirmation. Inference is of three sorts, namely, that of an effect from a cause as rain anticipated from cloud; and second is that of a cause from an effect as when we see a smoke* on a hill we conclude that there is fire; the third from a relation other than that

of a cause as the saltness of the sea concluded from that of sample of sea-water. By affirmation the commentators mean the Vedas or the sacred writings.

The twenty-five principles of Sāṅkhya's system are (first) Prakṛiti or Pradhāna; the universal and material cause; the root or the other plastic origin of all. It is eternal productive but not produced.

2. Intelligence otherwise called Mahat or Buddhi. This is the first production of nature and is the intellectual principle.

3. Ahankār or the consciousness of Ego or I am. This is produced by intellectual principle.

4—8. Five Tanmātrā or subtle particles or atoms perceptible to beings of a superior order, but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind. These are the production of the consciousness of ego.

9—13. Five instruments of sensation, namely, the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin.

14—18. The five instruments of action namely, the organ of speech, the hands, the

feet, the organ of excretion and the organ of generation.

19. Mind, serving both for sense and action.

20—24. Five elements produced from the five elemental particles, namely, (1) ether, or the vehicle of sound. It has the property of audibleness; (2) air, sensible to hearing and touch; (3) Fire, sensible to hearing, touch and sight; (4) water, sensible to hearing, touch, sight, and taste; earth, sensible to hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell.

25. Soul termed Purusa or Atman which is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, and immaterial. These twenty-five principles are thus contrasted in *Kàrikà* "Nature, root of all, is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one etc. are productions and productive; sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive."

Theory of creation.—By the union of soul and nature creation is effected. Nature, as the object to be experienced, depends

on soul, the experiencer. Soul looks to liberation as it seeks to throw off three kinds of pain which, though really apart from it, have come to it by its falling under the shadow of intellect through not recognizing its distinction. The soul wishes either fruition or liberation. For this purpose it is invested with a subtle body which is composed of seventeen principles, namely intellect, consciousness of ego, mind, five organs of sensation, five organs of action, and five subtle elements.

This subtle body is called Linga Sarira which is produced from original nature at the initial development of principles. It is unconfined and is never subject to obstruction. As long as it is not invested with a grosser body it is incapable of enjoyment. It is, however, affected by sentiment. The grosser body of the soul is for the purpose of fruition and is composed of five elements. The grosser body, with which a soul, clad in its subtle form, is invested for the purpose of fruition, is composed of the five elements; or of four, excluding the ethereal, according to some

authorities: or of one, earth alone, according to other. That grosser body, propagated by generation, is perishable. The subtile person is more durable, transmigrating through successive bodies, which it assumes, as a mimic shifts his disguises to represent various characters.

The corporeal creation (Bhautika-sarga), consisting of souls invested with gross bodies, comprises eight orders of superior beings and five of inferior; which, together with man who forms a class apart, constitute fourteen orders of beings, distributed in three worlds or classes. The eight superior orders of beings bear appellations familiar to Hindu theology; Brahma, Prajapati, Indras, Pitris, Gandharvas, Yakshas, Rakshas, and Pishachas; gods or demi-gods, demons, and evil spirit.

The inferior orders of beings are quadrupeds, distinguished in two order; birds; reptiles, fishes, and insect; vegetable and inorganic substances.

Above is the abode of goodness, peopled by beings of superior orders; virtue prevails

there, and consequent bliss, imperfect however, in as much as it is transient. Beneath is the abode of darkness or illusion, where beings of an inferior order dwell: stolidity or dullness is there prevalent. Between is the human world, where dullness or passion predominates, attended with continual misery.

Throughout these worlds sentient soul experiences ill arising from decay and death until it be finally liberated from its union with person.

Prakriti, according to the Sāṅkhya, is the originator of the creation. It is evolved out of her and is not a mere outcome of volition. This *Prakriti*, although a subtle elementary principle or *tattwa*, is regarded as consisting of three *gunas* or constituent principles. These are namely, *Satwa*, goodness, *Rajàs* passion and *Tamasà*, darkness. *Prakriti* is the *Sāmyàvasthà*, or the state of equipoise of these three-fold constituent principles. The creation also, according to them, is pervaded by these three *gunas*. These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature but are of its

essence and enter into its composition. "We speak of the qualities of nature as we do of the trees of a forest." Says the Sāṅkhya, i. e., as the trees are the principal ingredients that make up a forest, so the three *gunas* are the principal ingredients that make up Prakriti. Things, of the same constituent principles, can be created by one having the same, and thus the Sāṅkhya teachers hold that, the creation, which is at one with threefold *gunas*, cannot proceed from God, who is devoid of them, nor can it spring from the soul which is equally devoid of them. They must proceed from Prakriti. Thus from white thread white cloth is produced and from black thread black cloth. Thus from Prakriti, composed of three *gunas*, the three worlds, composed of three *gunas*, must proceed.

The existence of soul is proved by several arguments. "The assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use," as a bed is for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter: that other, who uses it, must be a sensitive being and the sensitive being is soul.

There is not one soul to all bodies as a string on which pearls are strung; but a separate soul for each particular body. "Multitude of souls" is proved by the following arguments. "Birth, death and the instruments of life are allotted severally." If one soul animates all bodies, one being born all would be born, one dying all would die, one being blind, or deaf or dumb all would be blind or deaf or dumb; one seeing all would see, one hearing all would hear; one speaking all would speak. Birth is the union of the soul with instruments, namely, intellect, consciousness, mind and corporeal organs; it is not a modification of soul, for soul is unalterable. Death is its abandonment of them not an extinction of it, for it is imperishable.

Soul is devoid of qualities, it is discriminative: it is no object of enjoyment; it is several or peculiar, it is sensitive, aware of pain and pleasure, unprolific, for nothing is generated by it. *Kārikā* then compares soul with other principles, "Soul is a witness, bystander, spectator, solitary and passive." Therefore, by reason of union with it,

unsensible body seems sensible, and though qualities be active, soul is the agent. Nature is compared to a female dancer, exhibiting herself to soul.

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CHAPTER II.

YOGA.

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NEXT to the system of Kapila, comes the Yoga system of philosophy—a system, which, though unfavourably commented upon by European scholars as being no regular philosophical system, is still the grandest heir-loom bequeathed by the great Rishi Patanjali. According to Colebrooke, he is the author of the great grammatical commentary called the *Mahābhāṣyam* and likewise of a celebrated medical treatise called *Charaka*. Sir Monier William observes that, Patanjali, the author of *Yoga Sutra*, was not the same person. The collection of *Yoga Sūtras*, bearing the common title of *Sāṅkhya Pravachanam*, is divided into four chapters: The first on contemplation; the second on the means of its attain-

ment; the third on the exercise of transcendent power; the fourth on abstraction or spiritual insulation. There are several commentaries on this work of which the most important are those of Bhojaraja, Bhojadeva, Vachaspati Misra, Vijnāna Bhikshu and Nāgaji Bhatta.

Excepting one most important point the system of Patanjali is the same as that of Kapila in other minor points. They are so greatly allied in those respects that by some both the systems are popularly called Sāṅkhya—Kapila's system being athiestical and Patanjali's system is theistical. The main point of difference is, that according to Kapila, *Purusha* is neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable and immaterial. He does not admit creation by volition, alleging that there is no proof of God's existence, unperceived by the senses, not inferred from reasoning, nor yet revealed. He acknowledges indeed a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute, the source of all individual intelligences and origin of other existences

successively evolved and devolved. He expressly affirms that the creator of worlds iswara is demonstrated, the creator of worlds in such sense of creation : for "the existence of effects," he says, "is dependent upon consciousness not upon iswara," and "all else is from the great principle, intellect." Yet that being is finite, having a beginning and end—with the development and consumption of the universe. But Kapila positively denies the existence of a creator who creates the universe by volition. He says, "Detached from nature, unaffected therefore by consciousness and the rest of nature's trammels he could have no inducement to action ;" fettered by nature he could not be capable of creation.

Whereas according to Patanjali the Purusha is God. "This God Iswara is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected by ills with which they are beset ; unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences and with fancies of passing thoughts. In Him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have

a beginning ; himself infinite and unlimited by them."

This is the principal outline of difference between the system of Kapila and Patanjali. The end, of both the system, as well as of other systems of philosophy, is to secure freedom from pain and ills and the attainment of final beatitude. As regards the end they are all at one ; it is only with reference to the means that the different Schools vary. According to Kapila the discriminative knowledge of Tattwas or principles secures the freedom from the threefold pain, whereas, according to Patanjali, the promptest mode of attaining final emancipation and redemption from ills is the contemplation of God with devotion to Him. The word *yoga* literally means *union* *e.i.*, the union of the human soul with the Divine soul. Patanjali admits the existence of God as a recognised truth. The best means of becoming free from worldly trammels and the three-fold ill is to secure the unification of the human soul, with the supreme spirit. The grandest conception of the Hindu Yogins is that he not only wants to meditate upon the

Supreme Spirit but seems to realize Him within himself, and is not satisfied till his own spirit is identified with the great spirit. This unification is the *summum bonum* of a man's life in the view of a Hindu Yogin.

Thus the end of this system of philosophy is the liberation from ills and this liberation is produced by the unification of the human soul with the Divine Soul.

This unification is produced by knowledge. Knowledge again comes from meditation. This meditation is again effected by mental concentration for which eight means have been enumerated by Patanjali—(1) *Yama*, forbearance, (2) *Niyama* religious observance, (3) *Āsana*, postures (4) *Prānāyāma*, suppression of vital breaths (5) *Pratyāhara* restraint of senses, (6) *Dhāraṇa* steadying of mind (7) *Dhyāna* contemplation, (8) *Samādhi* profound meditation. Thus we see that, the Hindu Yoga system is both subjective and objective. The ultimate process is to control the mind. The objective process may appear as quixotic to some, but on analysing them properly it is clearly seen that in order to have a

real concentration of the mind, it is always safe to have a mastery over mental and physical functions. As by a systematic physical exercise a man's physique grows better day by day, so by a sort of mental drill a man's mental faculties gradually develop. There are many latent faculties in a man's mind, which, if properly cultured, might be turned into a good account. It is for this only that many supernatural powers are attributed to Yogins. The highest aim of a Hindu's life is not to lead a godly life on earth but to lose himself in the great soul.

His grandest object consists in being like a god. Therefore we find a continued attempt on a part of a Hindu Yogin to withdraw himself from all worldly things to acquire a mastery over physical and mental functions, and thus in the long run, to make his own soul, through these exercises, identified with the Divine Soul.

CHAPTER III.

NYA'YA AND VAISESHIKA.

IN this section we will deal with the dialectic philosophy of Gautama and the atomical one of Kanéda respectively called *Nyāya* 'reasoning' and *Vaisesika* 'particular.' The first deals with the metaphysics of logic and the second with physics that is with particulars of sensible objects. They are rightly speaking, the parts of one system supplying each other's deficiencies; commonly agreeing upon such points as are treated by both, yet on some differing and therefore giving origin to two schools, the *Naiyāyika* and *Vaisesika*.

Works extant.—The text of Gautama *Nyāya Sūtras* is a collection of *Sūtras* in five books or lectures, each divided into two daily lessons and these again subdivided into sections.

Kanāda's collection of *Sūtras* consists of lectures similarly divided into two daily lessons and those into *prakaranas* or sections.

There are a triple set of commentaries on the *Sūtras* of Kanāda and Gautama. They

are severally called *Bhāṣya*, *Vārtika* and *Tīkā*. These are of so great authority and antiquity that the modern commentators are often confounded whether a certain passage is to be considered a *Sūtra* or a *gloss*. The leading commentaries are *Varttikatātparyā Tīkā* of Vachaspati Misra, *Vartitka Tātparyā Parisuddhi* of Udayana, the scholia of Vishvanāth on Gautama's text and that of Sankara Misra upon Kanāda. Besides these there are other important treatises namely (1) *Nyāya Lilāvati* of Ballabha-acharya (2) *Tarkabhāṣā* of Kesava Misra (3) *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśha* of Govardhana Misra (4) *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā* of Gourikānta (5) *Tarkabhāṣā Sāra Manjari* of Mahadeva (6) *Nyāya Sangraha* of Rāmalingakṛiti.

There is another compendious work on Indian logic *Padārthadīpikā* by Konda-bhatta, a noted grammarian. There are some metrical treatises the most important of which are *Kusumanjali*, *Nyāya Samkshepa*.

Doctrine.—The order observed both by Gautama and Kanada, in delivering the precepts of the science, which they engage to

unfold, is enunciation, definition and investigation. Enunciation (*Uddesa*) is the mention of a thing by its name. Definition (*Lakshana*) sets forth a peculiar property, constituting the essential character of a thing. Investigation (*Parikshá*) consists in disquisition upon the pertinence and sufficiency of the definition. Consonantly to this the teachers of philosophy premise the terms of the science, proceed to the definitions and then pass on to the examination of subjects so premised.

In a logical arrangement the "predicaments" *Padárthas* or objects of proof are six as they are enumerated by Kanáda; *viz.*, substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and aggregate or intimate relation; by which a seventh is added by other authors; privation or negation. These again compose a two-fold arrangement; positive and negative; *Bháva* and *Abháva*, the first comprising six and the latter one.

According to the Buddhists this *padártha* or predicament is knowledge (*Jñána*) and according to the *Vedantists* the predicament

or object is *Brahma*, the universal being in whom all exists.

Gautama enumerates sixteen heads or topics : among which, proof or evidence and that which is to be proven are chief ? the rest are subsidiary or accessory as contributing to knowledge and ascertainment of truth. They are (1) proof (2) that which is to be known and proven (3) doubt (4) motive (5) instance (6) demonstrated truth (7) member of a regular argument or Syllogism (8) reasoning by reduction to absurdity (9) determination or ascertainment (10) thesis or disquisition (11) controversy (12) objection (13) fallacious reason (14) perversion (15) futility (16) confutation.

There is no discrepancy between these two arrangements. They are held to be reconcilable : the one more ample, the other more succinct ; but both leading to like results.

Nyāya as well as the *Sāṅkhya* concur with other schools of philosophy in promising beatitude and *moksha*, deliverance from the evil for the reward of a thorough knowledge of the principles which they teach.

Soul then is that which is to be known and proven. Gautama, however, enumerates under this head, besides soul, its associate body, the external senses, things or the objects of senses, intellect or understanding, mind or the internal organ, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit or consequence of deeds, pain or physical evil and lastly liberation, making together with soul twelve objects of proof.

I. Evidence or proof by which these objects are known and demonstrated is of four kinds :—(1) perception (2) inference of three sorts (consequent, antecedent and analogous) (3) comparison ; and (4) affirmation (comprising tradition and as well as revelation),

II.—(a) The first and most important, of twelve objects of evidence or matters to be proven, enumerated by Gautama, is soul. It is the site of knowledge or sentiment ; distinct from body and from the senses ; different for each individual co-existent person, infinite eternal, perceived by the mental organ. This is the living soul *Jivâtma* or animating spirit of an individual person. But the Supreme Soul or *Paramâtma* is one, the seat of eternal

knowledge; demonstrated as the maker of all things. The individual soul is infinite for wherever the body goes there the soul too is present. It experiences the fruits of its deeds; pain or pleasure.

(b) The second of evidence is body. It is the site of effort, of organs of sensation, and of sentiment of pain or pleasure. It is ultimate, compound; the seat of soul's enjoyment. It is earthly, for the qualities of the earth are perceived in it.

(c) Next, among objects of proof, are the organs of sensation. An organ of sense is defined as an instrument of knowledge, conjoined to the body and imperceptible to the senses.

There are five external organs; smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing; they are not modifications of consciousness (as the Sāṅkhyas maintain) but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air and ether respectively.

The pupil of the eye is not the organ of sight, nor is the outer ear the organ of hearing. But a ray of light proceeding from the

pupil of the eye towards the objects viewed is the visual organ. Thus the ether contained in the cavity of the ear and communicating by the intermediate ether with the object heard is the organ of hearing.

Thus the organ of vision is lucid, the organ of hearing is etherial, that of taste, aqueous, that of feeling ærial and that of smelling earthly.

The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye ; of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear ; of the olfactory organ, the nostril or tip of the nose ; of the taste, the tip of the tongue ; of the feeling, the skin.

The objects, apprehended by the senses, are odour, flavour, colour, touch, and sound.

The existence of organs of sense is proved by inference from the fact of the apprehension of those objects. For apprehension implies an instrument to effect it.

The organs are six including an internal organ, termed *Manas* or mind. It is the instrument, which affects the apprehension of pain, pleasure or interior sensations, and by its union with external senses, produces

knowledge of exterior object apprehended through them, as colour, etc.

(d) Next in Gautama's arrangement are (*Artha*) objects of sense; that is of internal senses, and he enumerates odour, taste, colour, feel and sound, which are the peculiar qualities of earth and the rest of the elements respectively.

These objects correspond with the *Padartha* or categories of Kanâda which are six in number, namely substance, quality, action (Karma), community, difference (*Visesha*), or aggregation (*Samavâya*.)

To the six affirmative categories of Kanâda succeeding writers add a seventh which is negative.

I. Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect or product. It is the site of qualities and of action; those specified by Kanâda are nine in number; they are:—

(1) Earth, (2) Water, (3) Light, (4) Air, (5) Ether, (*Âkasa*), (6) Time, (7) Place, or space, (8) Soul, (9) Mind.

Material substances are considered by Kanâda to be primarily atoms and secondarily

aggregates. He maintains the eternity of atoms ; and their existence and aggregation are explained as follows.

The mote, which is seen in a sun-beam, is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and effect, it must be composed of what is less than itself, and this, likewise, is a substance and an effect ; for the component part of a substance, that has magnitude, must be an effect. This again must be composed of what is smaller ; and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed, else, the series would be endless.

The first compound consists of two atoms, for one does not enter into composition ; and there is no argument to prove that more than two must, for inchoation, be limited. The next consists of three double atoms ; for if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be proved either by size or number of particles ; it cannot be their size, and, therefore, it must be their number.

Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creation of the will of

God or time or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and by concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced, and by concourse of four triple atoms a quaternary atom; and so on to a gross, grosser or grossest mass of earth; thus great earth is produced; and in like manner great water from aqueous atoms, great light from the luminous; and great air, from the ærial ones.

The dissolution of substances proceeds inversely. In the integrant parts of an aggregate substance resulting from composition, as in the postherds of an earthen jar, action is induced by preasure, attended with velocity or by simple pressure. Disjunction ensues; whereby the union, which was the cause of inchoation of members, annulled, and the integral substance, consisting of those members, is resolved into its parts and is destroyed, for it ceases to subsist as a whole.

(II) Quality is closely united with substance, not however as an intimate cause of it, nor consisting in motion, but common; not a genus yet appertaining to it. It is

independent of conjunction and disjunction ; not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities. Twenty-four are enumerated ; seventeen only are specified in Kanáda's aphorisms but the rest are understood. They are (1) colour, (2) savour, (3) odour—which again is divided into two, fragrance and stench, (4) feel, (5) number, 6) quantity, (7) individuality, (8) conjunction, (9) disjunction, (10—11) priority and posterity, (12) gravity, (13) fluidity, (14) viscosity or the quality of clamminess and cause of agglutination, (15) sound.

The following eight qualities are perceptible by the mental organ, not by the external senses. They are qualities of the soul and not of material substances :—(16 Intelligence, (17) Pleasure, (18) Pain, (19—20) desire and aversion, (21) volition, (22—23) virtue and vice, *Dharma* and *Adharma* or moral merit and demerit, (24) the faculty of *Samskára*.

This last again comprehends three sorts :—*Velocity* which is the cause of action ; it concerns matter only ; *elasticity* which is a quality of a particular tangible terrene object and is the cause of that particular action

whereby an altered thing is restored to its pristine state; *imagination* which is a peculiar quality of the soul and is the cause of memory.

III. The next head in Kanādā's arrangement after quality is action (Karma). It consists in motion and like quality abides in substance alone.

IV. Community (*Samānya*) or the condition of equal or like things is the 'cause of the perception of conformity. It abides in substance, in quality and in action.

V. Difference (*Viśeṣa*) or particularity is the cause of perception of exclusion. It affects a particular and single object which is devoid of community.

VI. The sixth and last of Kanādā's categories is aggression (*Samavāya*) or perpetual eternal relation.

VII. To the six categories of Kanāda succeeding writers add a seventh which is negative.

Negation or privation (*Abhāva*) is of two sorts, universal and mutual; universal negation

comprehends three species, antecedent, emergent and absolute.

Antecedent privation (*Pràgàbhàva*) is present negation of that which, at a future time, will be. It is negation in the material cause previous to the production of an effect ; as in yarn prior to the fabrication of cloth, there is antecedent privation of the pièce of cloth, which is to be woven.

Emergent privation is destruction or cessation of effect. It is negation in the cause subsequent to the production of the effect, as in a broken jar the negation of jar in the heap of potsherds. Absolute negation (*atyàntàbhàva*) extends throughout all times, present, past and future. It has neither beginning nor end. For example, fire in a lake, colour in air.

Mutual privation (*anyonyàbhàva*) is difference (*bhàva*) which is said to exist between two notions which have no property in common.

(e) To return to Gautama's arrangement. The fifth place, next objects of sense, is by him given to intelligence (*Buddhi*), appre-

hension, knowledge, or conception; defined as that which manifests or makes known a matter.

It is two-fold; notion and remembrance. Notion is of two sorts, right notion and wrong notion. Right notion derived from proof; wrong notion is deviates from truth and is not derived from proof.

Remembrance is, likewise, either right or wrong. Both occur and right remembrance especially, while awake. But in sleep remembrance is wrong.

(f) The sixth place among objects of proof is not allotted to mind.

(g) The seventh place is given to activity. It is determination, the result of a passion and the cause of virtue and vice or merit and demerit, according to the act is one enjoined or forbidden.

(h) From acts proceed faults; including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loathing; and error or delusion.

(i) Next in Gautama's arrangement is *Pretiyabhāva*, the condition of the soul after

death ; which is transmigration ; for the soul being immortal passes from a former body which perishes to a new body which receives it.

(j) Retribution (*Phala*) is the fruit accruing from faults which result from activity.

(k) Pain or anguish is the eleventh object of proof.

(l) Deliverance from pain is beatitude ; it is absolute prevention of every sort of ill. This liberation from ill is attended by soul, acquainted with the truth (Tattva) by means of holy science ; divested of passion through knowledge of the evil incident to objects ; meditating on itself ; and, by the maturity of self-knowledge, making its own essence present ; relieved from impediments ; not earning fresh merit or demerit, by deeds done with desire, discerning the previous burden of merit or demerit by devout contemplation ; and acquitting it through compressed endurance of fruit ; and thus (previous acts being annulled and present body departed and no future body accruing) there is no connection with the various sorts of ill, since there is no

cause for them. This then is the prevention of pain of every sort ; it is deliverance and beatitude.

III After proof and matter to be proven, Gautama proceeds to other categories and assigns the next place to doubt.

It is the consideration of diverse contrary matters in regard to one and same thing ; and is of three sorts, arising from common or from peculiar qualities, or merely from contradiction ; discriminative marks being in all three cases unnoticed. Thus an object is observed concerning which it becomes a question whether it be a man or a post : the limbs which would betoken the man and the crooked trunk which would distinguish the post being equally unperceived.

IV. Motive (*Prayojana*) is that by which a person is actuated or moved to action. It is the desire of attaining pleasure or of shunning pain ; or the wish of exemption from both.

V. Instance (*Drishtānta*) is, in a controversy, a topic on which both disputants consent. It is either concordant or discordant : direct or inverse ; as the culinary hearth, for

a direct instance of the argument of the presence of fire betokened by smoke.

VI. Demonstrated truth (*Siddhānta*) is of four kinds; *vis.*, universally acknowledged; partially so; hypothetically; argumentatively.

Thus existence of substance, or of that to which properties appertain, is universally recognised, though the abstract notion of it may not be so; for the Bauddhas deny abstraction. Mind is by *Naiyāyikas* considered to be an organ of perception and so it is by the kindred sect of *Vaiseshikas*. The eternity of sound is admitted in the *Mimāṃsā* and denied in the *Nyāya*.

VII. A regular argument or complete syllogism (*Nyāya*) consists of five members or component parts, 1. proposition (*Pratijnā*); 2. the reason (*Hetu*); 3. the instance (*Uddaharaṇa* or *Nidarshana*); 4. the application (*Upanayana*); 5. conclusion (*Nigamana*).

Example :—

1. The hill is fiery.
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes is fiery: as a culinary hearth.

4. Accordingly the hill is smoking.

5. Therefore it is fiery.

Some confine the syllogism to three members; either the three first or the three last. In this latter form it is quite regular. The recital joined with the instance is the major; the application is the minor; the conclusion follows

VIII. Next in this arrangement is (*Tarka*) reduction to absurdity. It is a mode of reasoning, for the investigation of truth, by deduction from wrong premises to an inadmissible conclusion which is at variance with proof, whether actual perception or demonstrable inference. The conclusion, to which the premises would lead, is inadmissible as contrary to what is demonstrated or as conceding what is proved.

IX. Ascertainment or determination of truth is the fruit of proof, the result of evidence and of reasoning, confuting objections and establishing the proposition in question.

X—XII. Disputation (*Kathā*) is conference or dialogue of interlocutors maintaining adverse positions, whether contending for

victory or seeking the truth. It is of three sorts namely (a) *Jalpa*, debate of disputants contending for victory ; (b) *Vāda* discourse or interlocution of persons commenting on a topic in pursuit of truth ; (c) *Vitandā* cavil or controversy, wherein the disputant seeks to confute his opponent without offering to support a position of his own.

XIII. Next in Gautama's enumeration is fallacy, or as it is termed, semblance of a reason.

XIV. Fraud (*Chhala*) or perversion and misconstruction is of three sorts : 1. verbal misconstruction of what is ambiguous ; 2. perverting, in a literal sense, what is said in a metaphorical one ; 3. generalising what is particular.

XV. After all these is (*Jati*) a futile answer, or self-confuting reply.

XVI. The sixteenth and last of Gautama's categories is (*Nigrahasthāna*) failure in argument or (*Parājaya-hetu*) reason of defeat. It is the termination of a controversy.

Neither the Nyāya nor the Vaiśeṣika must be regarded as expounding theology.

though the ideas of God are incidentally introduced. Their doctrine however is decidedly theistical. According to them "God is personal." He is not mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss but he is a substance of which existence, etc., are attributes: for it is impossible to think of existence, knowledge etc., without referring them to a subject which exists, which has knowledge. He is of infinite power, the ruler of the universe. There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoyment, without development and without a final end, for they are not united with mind, the instrument by which they are connected with the world among themselves and with the creator. Because this connection exists, because there is form, because individual souls have conscience, therefore, it is necessary to assume a God, who, by his infinite power and knowledge, is the author of this connection of the all-pervading harmony of the world. This argument of the existence of the Deity is based upon final causes in nature.

CHAPTER IV.

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PURVA MIMANSA.

OF the six systems of philosophy received among the Hindus four have been noticed in the previous chapters, *viz.*, the theistical and athæstical *Sāṅkhyas*, the dialectic *Nyāya* and the atomical *Vaiseshika*. The prior or the practical *Mimāṃsā* will now be considered

The object, of the *Mimāṃsā*, is the interpretation of the *Vedas*. "Its purpose," says a commentator "is to determine the sense of revelation." Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty. Here *duty* means sacrifices and other acts laid down in the *Vedas*.

The prior (*Purva*) *Mimāṃsā*, is practical as relating to works (*Karma*) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly called *Karma Mimāṃsā* in contradistinction to the theological which is named *Brahma-Mimāṃsā*.

It is not directly a system of philosophy : nor chiefly so. But in course of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation it incidentally touches upon philosophical topics.

Writers on Mimāṃsā. The reputed founder of this school of philosophy is Jaimini. The other ancient writers on this subject are Atreya, Badari, Bādrāyana, Labukāyana, Aitisayana and others.

The *Sūtras* or aphorisms attributed to Jaimini are arranged in twelve lectures, each sub-divided into four Chapters, ~~except the~~ third, sixth, and tenth lectures which contain twice as many, making the entire number sixty Chapters. These again are divided into sections, cases of topics (*adhikāraṇas*) ordinarily composing several *Sūtras* but not uncommonly restricted to one. The total number of *Sūtras* is 2652 and of *adhikāraṇas* 195 as numbered by Mādhavachārya.

The *Sūtras* are utterly unintelligible without a gloss and an ancient scholiast is quoted by the herd of commentators. The author of the extant commentary is

Savara-Swamibhatta from whom it takes the name of *Savarabhāṣya*. There is another commentary by Bhatta-Kumaril-Swami who oftentimes corrects Savara's gloss. Kumaril bhatta was a predecessor of Sankara and was equally rigid in maintaining the orthodoxy of the Vedas. He was an antagonist of Bauddhas. The age of Kumaril goes back to a thousand years. He is said to have been contemporary with the prince Sudonwá.

The next eminent commentator of the *Mimāṃsā* is Pārtha-Sārathi Misra who was evidently a follower of Kumaril-bhatta. His commentary called *Śāstra-dīpikā* has been expounded in a gloss called *Mayukhamālā* by Somānath. A compendious gloss on the text of Jaimini is the *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā* of Khanda deva who is also the author of another treatise called *Mimāṃsā Kaustabha*. The *Mimāṃsā Nyāya Viveka* is another commentary by a distinguished author Bhavanāth-Misra. Among numerous other commentaries of Jaimini's text the *Nyayavali-didhiti* of Rāghavānandā may be mentioned.

The most approved introduction to the

study of the *Mimāṃsā* is the *Nyaya-mātā-Vistāra* by Mādhavāchārya. It is in verse to which is attached a commentary in prose by the same author. It follows the order of Jaimini's text ; not by way of paraphrase but as a summary of its purport.

Mādhavāchārya was both priest and minister of Bukkaraya and Harihara, sovereigns of Vidyāngara on the Godāvari. He flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century.

Analysis of the Mimāṃsā.—A complete *adhikarana* or case consists of five members, *vis.*, 1. The subject or the matter to be explained ; 2. the doubt or question arising upon that matter ; 3. the first side or *Prima-facie* argument concerning it ; 4. the answer or demonstrated conclusion ; 5. the pertinence or relevancy.

Jaimini's text does not ordinarily exhibit the whole of the five members upon *Adhikarana*. Frequently the subject and the question concerning it are but hinted or they are left to be surmised.

Its introductory *Sutras* propose the subject in this manner. "Now then the study of *duty* is to be commenced. *Duty* is a purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must be inquired. Next after reading the *Vedas*, and therefore for the sake of understanding it, the *duty*, enjoined by it, is to be investigated. *Duty* is a meaning deduced from injunction; its ground must be sifted. A command is not implicitly received for proof of *duty*.

The *Mimāṃsā* attempts to investigate what ~~this duty~~ *duty* is, and the primary matter for enquiry is proof and authority. This is the subject of the first lecture comprising four chapters which treat of the following matters:—(1) precept and its cogency; (2) affirmation or narrative as well as prayer and invocation, their cogency as inculcating some duty; (3) *Smṛiti*, law memorial, *A'chāra* usage, their authority as presumption; (4) modifying ordinance and specific denomination distinguished from direct or positive injunction.

Proceeding with the subject as above proposed, the *Mimāṃsā* declares that perception

or simple apprehension is no reason of *duty*, for it apprehends a present object only, whereas *duty* concerns the future. Simple apprehension is defined in these words, "when the organs of man are in contiguity with an object, that source of knowledge is perception."

The ancient scholiast has here introduced definitions of other sources of knowledge, which the author had omitted *viz.*, inference, verbal communication, comparison, presumption and privation. None of these are reasons of *duty* except verbal communication; for the rest are founded on perception ~~which itself~~ is not so. Verbal communication is either human, being a declaration of a proper authority, or superhuman as a passage of the *Vedas*.

"On sight of one member of a known association, the consequent apprehension of the other part, which is not actually proximate, is (*anumāna*) inference.

"Comparison (*upamāna*) is knowledge arising from resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the likeness which a presently seen object bears to one before observed.

"Presumption (*Arthâpatti*) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.

"Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate, derived through understood sound, that is through words, the acceptation whereof is known in (*Sastra*) ordinance or revelation ; it is (*Savda*) verbal communication."

The first six lectures of Jaimini's *Mimâṃsâ* treat of positive injunction ; it is the first half of the work. The latter half, comprising six more lectures, concerns indirect command. The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture : its differences and varieties, its parts and purpose of performance are successively considered in the three next and complete the subject of that which is to be performed. The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture, and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth ; the subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally and in the eighth particularly. Inferrible changes are discussed in the

ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth. These leading topics of each lecture are not however exclusive. Other matters are also incidentally introduced.

In the first chapter of the first lecture occurs the noted discussion of this *Mimāṃsā* on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense. The literal translation of the Sutra reads thus "the natural connection of a word with its meaning causes the knowledge thereof; for there are ~~no~~ distractions and the absence of errors in respect to something imperceptible. This is the real source of knowledge."

The first chapter terminates with an enquiry into the authority of the Veda which is considered primæval and superhuman; although different portions of it are denominated from names of men, and worldly incidents and occurrences are mentioned. Those denominations of particular portions, it is affirmed, have reference to the tradition by which a revelation has been transmitted.

They are named after the person who uttered them as to him revealed.

The Veda is considered as eternal and superhuman, because no human author is remembered. Contemporaries have always been able to name the authors of human compositions, but such is not the case with the Veda.

The Veda consists of two parts, prayer and precept (*Mantra* and *Bràhmana*). Jaimini has attempted to give a short definition of the first, adding that the second is its supplement. "Whatever is not *Mantra* is *Bràhmana*." A *Mantra* is a prayer, invocation or declaration. It is expressed in the first person or is addressed in the second. *Mantras* are divided into three sorts. Those which are in metre are *Rich*, those chanted are *Sàman*, and the rest are *Yajush*, sacrificial prayers in prose. Metrical prayers are recited aloud, those termed *Sàman* with musical modulation; but the prose inaudibly muttered. The prayers termed *Rich* and *Sàman* are limited by the metre and chant respectively; but those which are in prose are

regulated as to their extent by sense. A complete sentence constitutes a single *Yajush*.

The *Bràhmana* of the Veda is in general precept; or it expresses praise or blame; or a doubt and reason or a comparison; or intimates a derivation, or narrates a fact or occurrence. The *Bràhmana* is practical, directing religious observances, teaching the purpose, time and manner of performing them, indicating the prayers to be employed and elucidating their import.

The *Mimànsà* maintains that ~~narrative~~ or indicative texts are proof of *duty* as concurrent in import with a direct precept. There exists a mutual relation between them. One enjoins or forbids an act; the other supplies an inducement for doing it or refraining from it. "Do so or such is the fruit." Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*Sruti*) of it, another evidence is founded on the recollections (*Smriti*) of an ancient sage. They possess authority as grounded on the Veda, being composed by holy personages, conversant with its contents. Nor was it superfluous to

compose anew what was there to be found ; for a compilation, exhibiting in a succinct form that which is scattered through the Veda, has its use.

Usage, generally prevalent among good men, and by them practised as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, an evidence of *duty* ; but it is not valid, if it be contrary to an express text. From the modern prevalence of any uses there arises a presumption of a correspondent injunction by a holy personage who remembered a revelation to the same effect. Thus usage presumes a *recollection*, which again pre-supposes *revelation*. Authors, however, have omitted particulars, sanctioning good customs in general terms : but any usage, which is inconsistent with a recorded recollection, is not to be practised so long as no express text of scripture is found to support it.

In the same way, rituals which teach the proper mode of celebrating religious rites and are entitled *Kalpa-Sutras* or *Grihya-Sutras* derive their authority from a presumption

that, their authors, being persons conversant with the Vedas, collected abridged rules which they there found. Whenever a *Sutra* (whether of the *Kalpa* or *Grihya*) is opposed to an extant passage of the Vedas, or is inconsistent with valid reason, it is not to be followed.

On the acceptation of words in correct language, the *Mimāṃsā* concludes that, in instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (Aryyas), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians who are apt to confound words with their meanings.

The subject, which most engages attention throughout the *Mimāṃsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. The unseen virtue is termed *apurva*, being a relation super-induced, *not before* possessed.

Sacrifice (*yāga*), which, among most meritorious works is the act of religion most inculcated by the Vedas and consequently most

discussed in the prior *Mimāṃsā*, consists in parting with a thing that it may belong to a deity, whom it is intended to propitiate. Being cast into the fire for that purpose it is a burnt offering (*homa*). Four sorts are distinguished ; a simple oblation (*Ishti*), the immolation of a victim, the presenting expressed juice of *Soma* plant and the burnt offering above mentioned. The object of certain rites is some definite temporal advantage ; of others benefit in another world. Three ceremonies in particular are types of all the rest ; the consecration of a sacrificial fire, the presenting of an oblation and the preparation of the *Soma*. The oblation, which serves as a model for the rest, is that which is offered twice in each month, *vis.*, on the full and change of the moon. It is accompanied more specially at the new moon with an oblation of whey from new milk. Accordingly the *Yajur-Veda* begins with this rite.

Concerning this ceremony with all its details numerous questions arise which are resolved in the *Mimāṃsā* : for instance the milking of the cow is pronounced to be not

a primary or main act but a subordinate one ; and the parting of the calves from their dams is subsidiary to that subordinate act. The whey, which in part is milk modified, is the main objet of the whole preparation.

In this way various other sacrifices are discussed in the chapter of the *Mimànsá*.

The full complement of persons, officiating at a great solemnity, is seventeen. This number, as is shown, includes the votary or principal, who is assisted by sixteen priests, engaged by him for different offices, which he need not personally discharge. His essential function is the payment of their hire or sacrificial fee. They rank in different gradations and are remunerated proportionately. Four, who are most important, receive the full perquisite ; four others are recompensed with a half ; the next four with a third, and the four last with a quarter.

On occasions of less solemnity four priests only are engaged, making with the principal five officiating persons. A question is raised whether the immolator of a victim at the

sacrifice of an animal be a distinct officiating person : the answer is in the negative. No one is specially engaged for immolation independently of other functions ; but some one of the party, who has other duties to discharge, slays the victim in the prescribed manner and is accordingly termed immolator.

The victims at some sacrifices are numerous ; as many as seventeen at *Vàjapeya*, made fast to the same number of stakes ; and at an *Aswamedha* not fewer than six hundred and nine of all descriptions, tame and wild, terrestrial and aquatic, walking, flying, swimming and creeping things, distributed among twenty-one stakes and in the intervals between them ; the tame made fast to the stakes.

The foregoing instances may suffice to give an idea of the nature of subjects treated in the prior *Mimāṃsā*.

CHAPTER V.

THE VEDA'N TA.

We have already given an account of *Purva Mimāṃsā* or properly speaking *Karma Mimāṃsā*. In the present Chapter we will give an account of *Brahma Mimāṃsā*, which, being a complement of the former, is called *Uttara*, later. The former deals with the *works* and merit consequent thereon as laid down in the *Vedas*, whereas ~~the latter~~ deals with the theology.

Uttara Mimāṃsā is popularly called *Vedānta*. The literal meaning of the term *Vedānta* is 'conclusion of the *Veda*,' and as such, it bears reference to the *Upanishadas*, which, properly speaking, deal with the theology of the *Vedas* and are their concluding portions. Among numerous *Upanishadas* those which are principally relied upon for the *Vedānta*, and which accordingly are not frequently cited, are the *Chhândogya*, *Kaushitaki*, *Brihadâranyaka*, *Aitareyaka*, *Taittiriya*, *Kuthaka*, *Kathavalli*, *Mandaka*,

Prasna, Svetâsvatara, Isa, Kena and one or two others.

Writers on the Vedânta.—The grand authority for the doctrines of *Vedânta* is the collection of *Sutra* or aphorisms, called *Brahma-Sutra* or *Sâriraka Mimânsâ*. The reputed founder of this system and the author of this grand work is Badarâyana, who is the same with Vyâsa or *Veda-Vyâsa*. According to the mythological account, he was in his former birth a Brahmana by name Apantara-tâmas, who acquired a perfect knowledge of revelation and divinity. By the will of the Providence he took a human form and compiled the Vedas. According to the Pauranic account he is an incarnation of Vishnu.

The *Sutras* of Badarâyana, are arranged in four books or lectures (*adhyâya*), each subdivided into four chapters or quarters (*pâda*). Like the *Sutras* of *Purva Mimânsâ* they are distributed very unequally into sections, arguments, cases or topics (*adhikarana*). The entire number of *Sutras* is 555, of *adhikarana* 101.

The *Sâririka Sûtras* are highly obscure and are not sufficiently intelligible without a gloss. Like the aphorisms of other systems of philosophy, they must, from the first, have been accompanied by the author's exposition of the meaning, whether orally taught by him or communicated by writing.

Of the early commentators of the *Brahma-Sûtras* Baudhâyana is one of the foremost. He is also the author of a treatise on law. Another commentator of both *Mimânsâ* is Upavarsha. He is noticed in the supplement to the *Amar-kosha* as a saint.

The most distinguished commentator of those *Sûtras* is *Sankara A'chârya*. His gloss bears the title of *Sâriraka-Mimânsâ-bhâsya*. It has been annotated and interpreted by a herd of commentators; and among others the most noted by Bâchhaspati-Misra in the *Sâriraka-bhâsya-vibhâga*.

Vâchhaspati's exposition of Sankara's gloss again has been amply annotated and explained in the *Vedânta-Kalpataru* of Analanada surnamed, Vyâsâsrama; whose notes in their

turn become the text for other scholia : especially a voluminous collection under the title of *Parimala* or *Vedanta Kalpataru parimala* by Apyaya-dikshita.

Another perpetual commentary of the *Sutras* of the *Sāriraka* by a distinguished author, is the work of the celebrated Rāmānuja, the founder of a sect, which has sprung as a schism out of the Vedānta.

There are other commentaries on the *Sāriraka Sutras* such as *Vedānta-Sutra-muktāvali* by Brahmānanda, Saraswati ; the *Brahma-Sutra-bhāṣya* or *Mimāṃsā-bhāṣya* by Bhāskarāchārya ; the *Vedānta Sutra Byākhyā Chandrikā* by Bhavadeva-Misra ; the *Vyāsa-Sutra-Vritti* by Raghunath ; *Subodhini* by Gangādhara ; and the *Brahma-mrita-Varshini* by Rāmānanda.

The *Vedānta-Sutra* is however a popular compendium of the entire doctrine of the *Vedānta*. It is the work of Sadānanda and has become the text of several commentaries.

Analysis : The *Uttara-Mimāṃsā* opens precisely as the *Purva*, announcing the purport of the work. The text is 'Next therefore

the inquiry is concerning God.' It proceeds thus : "(He is that) whence are the birth and continuance and dissolution of (this world) : (He is) the source of (revelation of) holy ordinance." This text, as expounded by the commentators, holds that the God is the omnipotent creator of the world and the omniscient author of the revelation.

The author of the *Sūtras* next enter upon a confutation of the *Sāmkhyas*, who hold that *Pradhāna*, which is the material cause of the universe, is identical with the omnipotent and omniscient cause of the world recognised by the Vedas. The author of the Vedānta system holds that, He is a sentient rational being ; not insensible as the *Prakṛiti* (nature) or *Pradhāna* (matter) of Kapila. Wish is attributed to that cause which is moreover termed *Atman* (soul). 'He wished to be many and prolific and became manifold.' The God is thus described in the *Upaniṣadas*. "The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe is essentially happy. He is the brilliant golden person seen within the solar orb and the human

eye. He is the ethereal element from which all things proceed and to which all return. He is the breath in which all beings merge, from which they all rise. He is the light which shines in heaven and in all places high and low, everywhere throughout the world and within the human person. He is the breath and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying and happy."

Such like topics are discussed in the second and third chapters of the first book. Such as concern God as the object of devout meditation and worship, are, for the most part, collected in the second chapter. Those, which relate to God as the object of knowledge, are reserved for the third. It is not the embodied (*Sárita*) and the individual soul, but the Supreme *Brahma* himself, on whom devout meditation is to be fixed as enjoined in a passage, which declares, 'this universe is indeed *Brahma*; for it springs from him, merges in him, and breathes in him; therefore worship him.'

In another dialogue in *Manduka Upanishada*, Angiras, in answer to Mahâsalâ, who,

with Saunaka, visited him for instruction, declares, "there are two sciences, one termed inferior, the other superior. The inferior comprises the four *Vedas* with their appendages, but the superior is that by which the unalterable being is comprehended, who is invisible (imperceptible by organs of sense), ungrasped (not apprehensible by organs of actions), come of no race, belonging to no tribe, devoid of eye, ear (or other sensitive organ), destitute of hand, foot (or other instruments of action), everlasting, present everywhere, yet most minute. Him invariable, the wise contemplate as the source or (cause) of beings. As the spider puts forth and draws in his thread, as the plants spring from the earth (and return to it), as the hair of the head and body grows from the living man, so does the universe come of the unalterable."

The succeeding section affirms the important tenet of the Vedanta that the supreme being is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The lecture is terminated by the aphorism intimating that in the

like manner as the opinion of a plastic nature and material cause (termed by the *Sāmkhyas*, *Pradhāna*) has been shown to be unsupported by the text of the *Veda* and inconsistent with its undoubted doctrine so, by the like reasoning, the notions of atoms and that of an universal void are set aside in favour of the only consistent position just now affirmed.

In two sections of the third chapter it is discussed whether any, besides a regenerate man (Hindu of the first three castes), is qualified for theological studies; and the solution of the question is that a Sudra, or a man of an inferior caste, is incompetent and that beings superior to man are qualified. In the fourth chapter of the first lecture the author returns to the task of confuting the *Sāmkhya* doctrine; and some passages of the *Vedas* apparently favouring that doctrine are differently interpreted by him.

The second lecture continues the refutation of Kapila's *Sāmkhya*, which, it is observed, is at variance with the *Smritis* as with the *Vedas*; and here the name of Manu is placed at the head of them. The same

argument is in the following section applied to the setting aside of the *Yoga-Smriti* of Patanjali so far as that is inconsistent with the orthodox tenets deduced from the Vedas.

The doctrine derived from the tenor of the Vedas, is to be supported, likewise, by reasoning independently of authority. "The objection; that the cause and effect are dissimilar, is not a valid one: instance of such dissimilarity are frequent. Hair and nails, which are insensible, grow from a sensible animal body. The argument too might be retorted; for, according to the adverse position, sentient beings are produced from an insensible plastic nature; on these and other arguments the orthodox doctrine is maintainable by reasoning: and by like arguments opinions, concerning atoms and an universal void, which are not received by the best persons, may be confuted.

The distinction relative to fruition, discriminating one who [enjoys and that which is enjoyed, does not invalidate the singleness and identity of *Brahma* as cause and effect. The sea is one and not other than its waters;

yet waves, foam, spray, drops, froth and other modifications of it, differ from each other.

An effect is not other than its cause. *Brahma* is single without a second. He is not separate from the embodied self. He is soul and the soul is he. Yet he does not do that only which is agreeable and beneficial to to self. The same earth exhibits diamonds, rocks, crystals, and orpiment etc; the same soul produces a diversity of plants, the same food is converted into various excrescences, hair, nails etc.

As milk changes to curd, water to ice, so is *Brahma* variously transformed and diversified, without the aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. The *Brahma* is entire without parts is no objection, he is not wholly transformed into worldly appearances. Various changes are presented to the same dreaming soul. Diverse illusory shapes and disguises are assumed by the same spirit.

Brahma is omnipotent, able for every act without organ or instrument. No motive or special purpose need be assigned for his creation of the universe, besides his will.

Unfairness and uncompassionateness are not to be imputed to him, because some (the gods) are happy, others (beasts and inferior beings) are miserable, and others (men) again partake of happiness and unhappiness. Everyone has his lot in the renovated world according to his merits, his previous virtue or vice in a former stage of a universe which is sempiternal and had no beginning in time. As though the rain cloud distributes rain impartially, yet the sprout varies according to the seed.

Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence etc.,) exists in *Brahma*, who is devoid of qualities.

The second chapter of the second lecture is controversial. The doctrine of the *Sāmkhyās* is confuted in the first section; that of the *Vaiśeṣikas* in two more; of *Bauddhas* in as many; of the *Jāinas* in one; of the *Pāsupātas* and *Panchāātras*, likewise in one each. It is curious that the *Nyāya* of Gotama is entirely unnoticed.

In the third chapter of the second lecture the task of reconciling seeming contradictions of passages in the *Vedas* is resumed.

"The origin of air and the ethereal element, unnoticed in the text of the Veda (*Chhândogya*) where the creation of the three other elements is described, has been affirmed in another (*Taittiriyaka*). The omission of the one is supplied by the notice in the other; there is no contradiction, as the deficient passage is not restrictive nor professes a complete enumeration. Ether and air are by *Sâmkhya*s created. But he himself has no origin, no preceptor, nor maker, for he is eternal without beginning as without end. So fire, and water and earth proceed mediately from him, being evolved successively, the one from the other as fire from air and this from ether. The element of earth is meant in diverse passages where food is said to proceed from water, for rain, fertilizes the earth. It is by his will, not by their own act, that they are so evolved; and conversely they merge one into the other, in the reversed order and are re-absorbed at the general dissolution of worlds previous to renovation of all things.

Intellect, mind and organs of senses and

action being composed of the primary elements are evolved and re-absorbed in no differed order or succession, but in that of the elements of which they consist.

The same evolution and re-absorption or material birth and death cannot be affirmed of the soul. Birth and death are predicated of an individual, referring merely to his association with body, which is matter fixed or moveable. Individual souls are in the *Vedas* compared to sparks issuing from a blazing fire ; but the soul is likewise declared expressly to be eternal and unborn. Its emanation is no birth nor original production. It is perpetually intelligent and constantly sensible as the *Sāmkhyas* too maintain ; as adventiously so merely by association with mind and intellect as the disciples of Kānada insist. It is for want of sensible objects, not for want of sensibility or faculty of perception, that the soul feels not during a profound sleep, fainting or trance.

The soul is not of finite dimensions as its transmigrations seemingly indicate ; nor minutely small abiding within the heart and

so bigger than the hundredth part of a hundredth of a hair's point ; but on the contrary, being identified with Supreme *Brahma*, it participates in his infinity.

The soul is active ; not as the *Sāmkhyas* maintain merely passive. Its activity, however, is not essential but adventitious. As the carpenter, having his tools in hand, toils and suffers, and laying them aside, rests and is at ease, so the soul, in conjunction with its instruments (the senses and organs), is active and quitting them reposes.

Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in its actions and fruition, in its attainment of knowledge, and consequent liberation and bliss, by the supreme ruler of the universe, who causes it to act conformably with his previous resolves.

The soul is a portion of the supreme ruler as a spark is of fire. The relation is not as that of a master and servant, ruler and ruled, but as that of whole and part. He does not, however, partake of the pain and suffering of which the individual is conscious, through sympathy, during its association with body.

As the sun's image, reflected in water, is tremulous, quaking, with the undulations of the pool, without however affecting other watery images nor the solar orb itself ; so the sufferings of one individual affect not another nor the supreme ruler. But, according to the doctrine of the *Sāṃkhya*s who maintain that souls are numerous, each of them infinite and all affected by one plastic principle nature, the pain or pleasure which is experienced by one must be felt by all. The like consequence is objected to the doctrine of Kanáda"

The fourth chapter of the second book proceeds in the task of reconciling apparent contradiction of passages in the *Vedas*.

The corporal organs of sense and of action, designated by the term *prāna* in a secondary acceptance, have, like the elements and other objects treated in the foregoing chapter, a similar origin as modifications of *Brahma*. In various passages the number of corporal organs is differently stated from seven to thirteen. Where a greater number is specified the term is employed in its most comprehensive sense ; where fewer are men-

tioned, it is used in a more restricted acceptation. They are finite and small ; not however minute as atoms, nor yet gross, as the coarser elements.

In its primary or principal signification *prana* is vital action and chiefly respiration. It is not wind (*vāyu*) or the air which is breathed, though so described in numerous passages of the Vedas and other authorities.

It is the supreme ruler, not the individual soul, who is described in passages of the Vedas as transforming himself into diverse combinations, assuming various names and shapes deemed terrene, aqueous or igneous, according to the predominancy of the one or other element.

The third lecture treats on the means whereby knowledge is attainable through which liberation and perpetual bliss may be achieved."

Next is given an account of the transmigration of the soul. " The soul is subject to transmigration. It passes from one state to another, invested with a subtile frame consisting of elementary particles, the seed or rudi-

ment of grosser body. Departing from that which it occupied it ascends to the moon ; where clothed with an aqueous form, it experiences the recompense of its works ; whence it returns to occupy a new body with resulting influence of its former deeds. But evil-doers suffer for their mis-deeds in the seven appointed regions retribution.

The returning soul quits its watery frame in the lunar orb and passes successively and rapidly through ether, air, vapour, mist and cloud into rain ; and thus finds its way into a vegetating plant and thence through the medium of nourishment into an animal embryo.

In the second chapter of this lecture the states or conditions of embodied soul are treated of. They are chiefly three ; waking, dreaming and profound sleep : to which may be added for a fourth, that of death and for a fifth that of trance, swoon or stupor, which is intermediate between death and profound sleep. In that middle state of dreaming there is a fanciful course of events, an illusory creation, which however testifies the existence

SECRET

DARSHANA, 77

NOT EXCHANGEABLE AND NOT SALABLE.

The two last lectures relate chiefly to devout exercises and pious meditation, the practice of which is inculcated as proper and requisite to prepare the soul and mind for the reception of divine knowledge and to promote its attainment.

As soon as that knowledge is attained past sin is annuled and future offence precluded. "As water wets not the leaf of

the lotus, so sin touches not him who knows God. In the same way the effect of the converse (that is of merit and virtue,) is by acquisition of knowledge annulled and precluded. It is at the death that these consequences take place. He traverses both (merit and demerit) thereby; "the heart's knot is broken, all doubts are split and his works perish when he has seen the Supreme Being. All sins depart from him," meaning good works as well as misdeeds, for the confinement of fetters is the same whether the chain be of gold or iron.

But only such antecedent sin and virtue are annulled, as had not begun to have effect, for their influence lasts until deliverance and then does he merge in the Supreme *Brahma*.

Having annulled by fruition other works, which had begun to have effect, having enjoyed the recompence and suffered the pains of good and bad actions, the possessor of divine knowledge, on the demise of the body, proceeds to a re-union with *Brahma*.

The fruit of divine knowledge having

been shown in the first chapter, the second chapter of this lecture, treats of the particular effect of devout exercises joined with appropriate meditation. It chiefly concerns the ascent of the soul or mode in which it passes from the body.

“This retirement from the body is common to ordinary un-informed people as to the devout contemplative worship until they proceed for this on their respective paths; and immortality is the fruit of pious meditation though impediments may not be wholly consumed and removed.

“In that condition the soul of the contemplative worshipper” remains united to a subtle elementary frame conjoined with the vital faculties until the dissolution of the worlds, when it merges in the Supreme deity. That elementary frame is minute in its dimensions, as subtle in its texture and is accordingly imperceptible to by-standers when departing from the body: nor is it oppressed by cremation or other treatment which that body undergoes.”

“But he, who has attained the true know-

ledge of God, does not pass through the same stages of retreat, proceeding directly to reunion with the Supreme being with which he is identified, as a river, at its confluence with the sea, merges therein altogether. It is vital faculties and the elements, of which this body consists, all the sixteen component parts which constitute the human frame, that are absorbed absolutely and completely; both name and form cease; and he becomes immortal, without parts or members.

The doctrine of the Vedānta:—The principal and essential tenets of the *Vedānta* are that God is omniscient and omnipotent cause of the existence, continuance and dissolution of the universe. He is both the efficient and material cause of the world, creator and creation, doer and deed. It is one, self-existent Supreme Being—is truth, wisdom, intelligence and happiness—devoid of the three qualities in the sense in which created beings possess them. At the consummation of all things all are resolved into him; as the spider spins his thread

from his own substance and gathers it in again.

The object matter of the *Vedānta* is the proof that the universe emanates in a successive development from a Supreme Spirit or Soul, which is called *Brahma* or *Paramatman*, the human soul is therefore identical in origin with *Brahma*; that the worldly existence of the human soul is merely the result of its ignorance of this sameness between itself and the Supreme Spirit, and that its final liberation or freedom from transmigration is attained by a removal of this ignorance which means by a proper understanding of the doctrine of the *Vedānta*.

Individual souls emanate from *Brahma* and are likened to innumerable sparks issuing from a blazing fire. From him, they proceed and to him they return being of the same essence. The soul, which governs the body together with its organs, neither is born, nor does it die. It is a portion of the divine substance, and as such, infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient, true

It is governed by the Supreme. Its acti-

vity is not of its essence, but inductive through its organs ; as an artisan, taking his tools, labours and undergoes toil and pain but laying them aside reposes, so is the soul active and suffers by means of its organs ; but divested of them, and returning to the Supreme one, it is at rest, and is happy. It is not a free and independent agent, but causes it to do in one state as it had purposed in a former condition. According to its pre-disposition for good or evil, for enjoined or forbidden deeds, it is made to do good or ill, and thus it has retribution for previous works. Yet God is not author of evil.

The soul, when existing in the body, is encased in a succession of sheaths. The first or inner case is the intellectual one, it is composed of the sheer (*tan-maira*) or simple elements uncombined and consists of the intellect (*Buddhi*) joined with the live senses.

The next is the mental sheath, in which mind is joined with the preceding. A third sheath or case comprises the organs of action and the vital faculties and is termed the

organic or vital case. These three sheaths constitute the subtile frame which attends the soul in its transmigrations; the interior rudiment confined to the inner case is the casual frame (*Kàrana-sarira*).

The gross body (*Sthula-sarira*), which it animates from birth to death in any step of its transmigration, is composed of the coarse elements, formed by combinations of the simple elements. The exterior case, composed of elements so combined, is the nutrimentitious (*Annamaya*) sheath; and being the scene of coarse fruition, it is, therefore, termed the gross body.

Organized bodies are arranged in three classes 1. viviparous, as man and quadrupeds; 2. oviparous, as birds and insects; 3. germiniparous, vermin and vegetable.

Three states of the soul in respect of the body are recognized, to which must be added a fourth and a even a fifth, *viz.*, waking, dreaming, profoundly sleeping, half-dead and dead. While awake, the soul, associated with body, is active under the guidance of Providence and has to do with a real and

practical creation. In a dream there is an illusory and unreal creation. Dreaming is the mean between sleeping and waking. In profound sleep the soul is absent. Swoon or stupor is intermediate between sleep and death.

Three degrees of liberation or deliverance are distinguished. One incorporeal which is that last mentioned and is complete ; another imperfect which is that before mentioned, taking effect upon demise when the soul passes to the highest heaven, the abode of *Brahma*. The third is effectual in life-time and enables the possessor of it to perform supernatural actions.

These several degrees of deliverance are achieved by means of certain sacrifices or by religious exercises in various prescribed modes together with pious meditation on the being and attributes of God : but the highest degree of it is attainable only by perfect knowledge of the divine nature and of the identity of God with that which emanated from Him.

We have described in these pages the

tenets of the *Vedānta* as taught by the text of Vyāsa. The notion, that the versatile world of an illusion, (*Máyá*), that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination and every seeming thing is unreal and all is visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the *Vedānta*.

APPENDIX A.

CHĀRVA'KAS.

Chārvāka is mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* as a Rākshasa, who endeavoured, by a false report of Bhima's death, to ruin the Pândavas in the moment of their final triumph. The founding of the sect however is generally attributed to Brihaspati, who promulgated these doctrines to overthrow the power of the sons of Rajee.

The *Chārvākas* recognize four (not five) elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire and wind; and acknowledges no other principles (*tattva*).

The most important and characteristic tenet of this sect concerns the soul which they deny to be other than body. Seeing no soul but body they maintain the non-existence of soul other than body, and arguing that intelligence or sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire and air, whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the same elements modified in a corporeal frame; they affirm that an organic

body, endued with sensibility and thought. formed of these elements, is the human person.

While there is body there is thought and sense of pleasure and pain ; none when body is not ; and hence, as well as from self-consciousness it is concluded that self and body are identical.

Bārhaspatya-Sutras is the standard work of this sect or school.

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B.

MA'HESWARAS AND PA'SUPA'TAS.

The devoted worshippers, of Shiva or Maheshwara, take their designation from this last named title of the Deity whom they adore and whose revelation they profess to follow.

The important tenets of this sect are :—

(*Kāraṇa* or cause. The *Pāsūpatas* hold that *Iśwara*, the Supreme Being, is the efficient cause of the world, its creator and superintending and ruling Providence, and not its material cause likewise. They, however,

identify the One Supreme God with Shiva or Pasupati and give him the title of Maheswara.

(2) *Kàrya* or effect, which is nature or plastic matter as the universal material principle, is by the *Pàsupàtas* denominated conformably with the terminology of the *Sámkhyas*.

(3) *Yoga*, abstraction; as perseverance in meditation on the syllable *Om*, the mystic name of the deity.

(4) *Vidhi*, enjoined rites; consisting in acts by performance of which merit is gained.

(5) *Dukhànta* termination of ill or final liberation (*mòksha*).

The purpose, for which these categories are taught and explained, is the accomplishment of deliverance from the bondage or fetters in which the leading soul is entangled and confined.

The *Pàsupàtas* argue that, as a potter is the efficient and not the material cause of the jar made by him, so the sentient being, who presides over the world, is the efficient and not the material cause of it.

The opinions of *Pàsúpatas* and other *Maheswaras* are heretical in the estimation of the *Vedántins*, because they do not admit pantheism or creation of the universe by the deity out of his own essence.

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PA'NCHARA'TRAS OR BHA'GAVATAS.

Among the Vaishnavas is a sect distinguished by the appellation of *Pàncharàtras* or *Bhàgavatas*. It is noticed in the *Bhárata*, with the *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, and *Pàsúpatas* as a system deviating from the *Vedas*; and a passage quoted by Sankara seems to intimate that its promulgator was Sândilya, who was dissatisfied with the *Vedas*. It is, however, by most ascribed to Nârâyana or Vâsudeva himself.

The religious doctrine of the sect is reconcilable on many points with the *Veda*; but in some essential respects it is at direct variance with that authority and consequently deemed heretical.

Vâsudeva, who is Vishnu, is by this sect

identified with *Bhāgavata*, the Supreme Being; the one omniscient, first principle, which is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, and ruling Providence. That being, dividing himself, became four persons by successive productions. From him immediately sprang *Samkarashana*, from whom came *Pradyumna*; and from the latter issued *Aniruddha*; *Samkarashana* is identified with the living soul; *Pradyumna* with mind and *Aniruddha* with egotism.

Vāsudeva or *Bhāgavata* being Supreme Nature and sole cause of all, the rest are effects. He has six special attributes:—(1) knowledge, (2) power, (3) strength, (4) irresistible will, (5) vigour, (6) energy.

Deliverance, consisting in the cessation of worldly ills, is attainable by worship of deity, knowledge of him and profound contemplation. By devotion, both active and contemplative, performed at five different times of each day and persisted in for a hundred years, Vāsudeva is attained.

D.

SA'MKHYA-KA'RIKA'.

1. The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain, for pain is embarrassment ; nor is the inquiry superfluous, because, although obvious means of alleviation already exists, absolute and final relief is not found to be thereby accomplished.

2. The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure ; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method, different from both, is preferable, consisting of discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

3. Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the great or intellectual one, etc are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive).

4. Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof for they are by all acknowledged and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof, that belief of that which is to be proven results.

5. Perception is attainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument and deduces) that which is argued by it. Right r mation is true revelation.

6. Sensible objects become known by perception ; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained ; and a truth, which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

7. From various causes a thing may be imperceptible (or unperceived) ; excessive distance, (extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

8. It is owing to the subtilty (of nature) not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect, and the rest of the derivative principles, are effects ; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.

9. Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause) ; for what exists not, can by no operation of cause) be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose ; everything is not by every means possible ; what is capable does that to which it is competent ; and like is produced from like.

10. A discrete principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, emergent, conjunct, governed. The indiscrete one is the reverse.

11. A discrete principle as well as the chief (or indiscrete) one, has the three qualities ; it is indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.

12. The qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness ; are adopted to manifestation, activity and restraint ; mutually domineer, rest on each other, produce on each other ; consort together, and are reciprocally present.

13. Goodness is considered to be alleviating and enlightening, foulness urgent and versatile ; darkness heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they co-operate for a purpose (by union of contraries).

14. Indiscriminateness and the rest (of the properties of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the verse. The indiscrete principle moreover (as well as the influence of the three qualities), is demonstrated by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety).

15. Since specific objects are finite ; since there is homogeneousness ; since effects exist through energy, since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a re-union of the universe,—

16. There is a general cause, which is indiscrete. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as water ; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively.

17. Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use ; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist ; since there must be superintendence ; since there must be one to enjoy : since there is a tendency to abstraction :—Therefore soul is.

18. Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally ; since occupations are not at once universal ; and since qualities affect variously, multitude of souls is demonstrated.

19. And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows that soul is witness, solitary by-stander, spectator, and passive.

20. Therefore by reason of union with it, insensible, and though the qualities be active, the stranger *jñes* appears as the agent.

21. For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and the blind. By that union a creation is framed.

22. From nature issues the great one, and hence egotism ; and from this the sixteen-fold set ; from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.

23. Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, Knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.

24. Consciousness is egotism. Thence proceeds

a two-fold creation. The eleven-fold set is one; the five elemental rudiments are the other.

25. From consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good eleven fold set; from it as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles; both issue from that principle affected by foulness.

26. Intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the voice, hands, feet, etc., etc.

27. (In this set is mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders; and it is an organ, as being cognate with the rest. They are numerous, by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities.

28. The function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treadings, etc., are the functions of five (other organs).

29. Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics. These are peculiar to each. The common functions of the three instruments is breath, and the rest of the five vital airs.

30. Of all four, the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The functions of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.

31. The instruments perform their respective functions incited by mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive; an instrument is wrought by none.

32. Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It compasses maintains, and manifests. What is to be done by it is ten-fold to be compassed, to be maintained and to be manifested.

33. Internal instruments are three, external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at the time present; the internal do so at any time.

34. Among these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.

35. Since intellectual, with the (other two) internal instruments, adverts to every object. therefore those three instruments are warders, and the rest are gates.

36. These characteristically differing from each and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.

37. Since it is intellect which accomplishes soul's fruition of all, which is to be enjoyed, it is that again which discriminates the suitable difference between the chief principle (Pradhâna) and soul.

38. The elementary particles are unspecific; from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed specific, for they are soothing, terrific or stupefying.

39. Subtile (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these the

subtile bodies are lasting ; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.

40. (Subtile body), primeval, unconfined, material composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying ; invested with dispositions, mergent.

41. As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or un-specific) particles.

42. For the sake of soul's wish that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence.

43. Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue, and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument.

44. By virtue is ascent to region above ; by vice descent to a region below ; by knowledge is deliverance, by the reverse is bondage.

45. By dispassion is absorption into nature ; by foul passion, migration ; by power unimpediment : by the reverse, the contrary.

46. This is an intellectual creation, termed *obstruction, disability*, acquiescence and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.

47. There are five distinctions of obstruction ; and from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of

disability ; acquiscence is ninefold ; perfectness eight-fold.

48. The distinctions of obscurity are eight-fold, as also those of illusion ; extreme illusion is tenfold ; gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is utter darkness.

49. Depravity of eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiscence and perfectness.

50. Nine sorts of acquiscence are propounded, four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck ; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

51. Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends and purity (or gifts) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.

52. Without dispositions there would be no subtle person ; without person there would be no pause of dispositions ; where a two-fold creation is presented, one termed *personal* the other *intellectual*.

53. The divine kind is of eight sorts ; the groveling is five-fold ; mankind is single in its class. This briefly, is the world of living beings.

54. Above there is prevalence of goodness ; below the creation is full of darkness ; in the midst is the predominance of foulness from Brahma to a stock.

55. There does sentient soul experience pain arising from decay and death, until it be relieved from its person ; wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence.)

56. This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively ; done for another's sake as for self.

57. As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

58. As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the indiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.

59. As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

60. Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

61. Nothing in my opinion is more gentle than Nature ; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

62. Verily, not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates ; but ~~by its relation to various beings, is bound, i.e. released and extra~~

63. By seven modes nature binds herself ; by one she releases (herself) for the soul's wish.

NOT EXCHANGEABLE AND
NOT SALABLE.

64. So, through study of principles, the conclusive incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

65. Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease, nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

66. He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

67. By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

68. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

69. This abstruse knowledge adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

70. This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to Asuri, Asturi taught it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively propagated.

71. Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in A'ryá metre by the piously

disposed Iswara Krishna having thoroughly investigated the demonstrated truth.

72. The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

THE TARKA-SANGRAHA OF ANNAM BHATTA.

Having placed in my heart the Lord of the world (that is, to say, having meditated on God), and having saluted my preceptor, I compose this treatise, named Compendium of Logical results for the pleasant instruction of the uninstructed.

Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Difference, C-inherence and non-existence,—these are the seven Categories.

Amongst those (that is to say, amongst the categories), Substance (that is to say, the abodes of qualities), are nine—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul and Mind.

Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severality, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit and Demerit, Faculty.

To throw upwards, to throw downwards, to contract, to expand, to go, these are called the five Actions.

Genus (that is to say, a common nature as the nature common to webs, etc.,) is of two kinds, higher and lower.

Differences which reside in eternal substances are endless.

Co-inherence is one only. Non-existence, Destruction, absolute non-existence, and mutual non-existence.

They call "Earth" that in which there is the quality, odour, It is of two kinds,—eternal, and uneternal. In its atomic character it is eternal; and when some product arises out of those atoms, then that is called uneternal.

This (that is to say, earth in the character of a product) is of three kinds, through these differences—body, organ of sense, mass. The body is that of us, men. The organ is the apprehender of odour, called the smell, which resides in the fore part of the nose. And the masses (that is to say, what have parts) are clods, stones, etc.

What appears cold on touching it, they call water.

And that (namely water) is of two kinds—eternal and uneternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that is called uneternal. In the form of products water is of three kinds, through the difference of body, sense and mass. The body exists in the world of Varuna, and the sense is the perceiver of savour, which they call the taste. It resides in the

forepart of the tongue. And the masses are rivers, seas, and the like.

That of which the sensation by touch is warm, they call light. This is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. This light in the form of products is of three kinds, through these differences—body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the solar realm—this is a familiar assertion. The sense of the percipient of colour, which they call the Light, resides in the forepart of the pupil of the eye. And the masses are of four kinds, through these differences,—produced in earth, produced in the sky, produced in the stomach, and produced in mines. Product in earth, it is, fire etc. Produced in the sky it is lightning and the like, the fuel of which is water. And that is resident in the stomach which is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. That light is produced in mines which, such as gold and the like, is found in mines.

That which has not colour, and has tangibility they call air. It is of two kinds, through the difference of body, sense and mass. The body is in the ærial world. The [sense is the] touch, the apprehender of tangibility, existing throughout the whole body. Its mass is that which is the cause of the shaking of trees and the like.

Air circulating within the body is called *prana*. Although it is but one, yet from the difference of its

accidents, it is called breath, flatulence, cerebral pulsation, general pulsation, and digestion.

They call that Ether in which there resides the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

The cause of the employment of "past," "present" and "future," they call Time. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

The cause of the employment of "East," "West," etc., they call Space. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

The substratum of knowledge (that is. that in which knowledge resides, they call Soul. The Supreme Soul is God, the Omniscient. He is One only, and devoid of joy and sorrow. And the animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal.

The sense which is the cause of the perception of pleasure and pain etc., they call the mind. And it is innumerable for this reason that it remains with each soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal.

That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of Sight, they call colour. And this quality is of seven kinds, through these differences: white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated. This quality resides in earth, water, and light. In earth, color of all the seven kinds: and lustrous white colour resides in light.

The quality which is known through the Taste, they call Savour. And it (namely, the quality of Savour; is of six kinds, through the differences of sweet, sour, saline, bitter, astringent, and pungent. This quality resides in earth and water. In earth there is savour of the six kinds, and in water, there is only the sweet savour.

The quality which is apprehended by the sense of smell, they call odour. It is of two kinds, fragrance and stench. This quality resides in earth alone

They call that quality Tangibility which they perceive only by the sense of touch. This quality is of three kinds, through the distinctions of cold, warm, and temperate (that is to say, neither cold, nor warm). This quality resides in earth, water, light, and air. Coldness to the touch resides in water, warmth to the touch in light, and temperateness in earth and air.

The four of which colour is the first, (that is to say Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility), may be produced in Earth (that is to say in earthly things) by maturation (that is to say, by the special conjunction heat, and they are then transient. In others (that is to say, in water; light, and air), colour and the like are not produced by the conjunction of heat. They are here eternal and transient. When they reside in eternal things, they are eternal; and when they reside in things which are not eternal, they are said to be transient.

They call the peculiar cause of the perception of unity and the like, Number. This (that is to say, number) resides in the nine substances ; and reckoning from unity, it is as far, as a *lak of laks of krors.*' Unity is both eternal and uneternal. It is eternal in an eternal thing, and uneternal in an uneternal thing ; but duality and the like is everywhere uneternal.

They call the [peculiar cause of the conception of bulk, Measure. This quality resides in the nine substances ; and it (that is to say, measure) is of four kinds, through the distinctions of small, great, long and short.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of things as numerically distinct, severally. This quality resides in all the substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of things as conjoined, conjunction. This quality also resides in all the substances.

They call the quality, which annihilates conjunction, Disjunction ; and this resides in all the substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of (things as), far and near, remoteness and proximity. These qualities reside in earth, water, light, air, and mind. They are of two kinds—made by space and made by time. There is remoteness made by space in that thing which remains in a distant place ; and proximity made by space, in that thing, which remains in a place near. In the person who is the

elder, there is remoteness made by time; and in the person, who is the younger, there is proximity made by time. (Distance and proximity are determined by relation).

They call the quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient falling, weight. This quality resides in earth and water.

The quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient trickling (that is to say, oozing, or melting, or flowing) is called fluidity. It affects earth, light, and water. This quality is of two kinds, natural (that is to say, established by its own nature), and adventitious (that is to say, produced by some cause). Natural fluidity resides in water; and adventitious fluidity resides in earth and light. In earthly substances (butter and the like), fluidity is produced by the conjunction of fire.

They call the quality by which particles and the like become heap, Viscidity. This quality resides in water alone.

They call the quality which is apprehended by the organ of hearing, sound. This quality resides only in the ether. It is of two kinds—inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is produced by the instrumentality of a drum and the like. Sound which is in the shape of the Sauskrit (the Hindi), or any language, is called articulate (that is to say, in the form of syllables).

Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception

(that can be put inwards) they call understanding. It is of two kinds.—remembrance and notion.

The knowledge that is produced only by its own antecedents (*i.e.*, by itself as its own antecedent), they call Remembrance, and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion. This (that is to say, notion) is of two kinds,—right and wrong.

Of whatever description anything is, when our idea of that thing is of the same description, it is called a right notion,—as in the case of silver, the idea of its being silver. This is called *prama* (that is to say, commensurate with its object). The supposing of a thing to be as the thing is not,—such a notion is called a wrong notion,—as in the case of a (pearly) shell, the notion of its being silver.

Right notion is four kinds, according to the division of perceptions, inferences, conclusions from similarity, and authoritative assertions understood. And the efficient causes of these (that is to say their peculiar causes) also are of four kinds, according to the division of perception, inference, recognition of similarity and authoritative assertion.

Whatever thing, through its operating, is the cause not common to all effects, of some given effect, that is the instrumental cause thereof.

That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted (*i.e.*, is not by any thing else, except the result in question, constituted a cause) is the cause of (that product).

That which annuls its own antecedent, non-existence, is called an Effect.

Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That in which an effect intimately relative to it takes its rise, is an intimate cause (of that effect),—as threads are of cloth and the cloth itself of its own colour, etc. When this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object (as a necessarily immanent cause) with such effect or cause, is not intimate. Thus, the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads that of the colour of the cloth. The cause, which is distinct from both of these, is the instrumental cause—as the weaver's brush, the loom, etc., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of cause, that only is called an instrumental cause, which is not a universally concurrent cause on condition (of all effects,—as God time, place, etc., are).

The cause of the knowledge (called sensation, is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense, and its object, is sensation. It is of two kinds: where it does not pay regard to an alternative, and where it does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alternative is that which involves no specification,—as in the simple cognition, that "this is something which exists." The knowledge which contemplates an alternative is that which includes a specification,—

as this is "Dittha," "this is a Brahmana," "this is black."

The relative proximity of a sense, and its object which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds :—(1) conjunction, (2) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (3) intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, (4) intimate union, (5) intimate union with that which is intimately united, and (6) the connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. For example : when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of intimate union with that which is in conjunction, because the colour is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generically is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, because the generic property of being a colour is intimately united with the particular colour which is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is intimate union between a quality and that of which it is the

quality. In the perception of the nature of sound (in a given sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united, because the nature of sound is intimately united with sound, which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the proximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which is so distinguished, because when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of the non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is conjunction with the organ of vision.

Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense. Thus it is settled that an organ of sense is what gives us the knowledge called sensation.

So much for the chapter on sense.

The instrument (in the production) of an inference is a generalised fact. An inference is the knowledge that arises from the deduction. Deduction is the ascertaining that the subject possesses that character which is invariably attended (by what we then predicate of it). For example, the knowledge that this hill characterised by smoke is always attended by fire" is a deductive application of a general principle; the knowledge produced from which, *vis*, that "the hill is fiery," is an inference. Invariable attendedness is the fact of being constantly accompanied, as in the example; Whenever there is smoke there is fire

(by which it is invariably, attended." By "the subjects possessing a character, etc., we mean that in a mountain or the like there is present that (e. g., smoke) which is invariably attended (e. g., by fire).

A general principle is of two kinds, in so far as it may be useful for one's self and another. That which is employed for one's self is the cause of a private conclusion is one's own mind. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like that where there is smoke there is fire, having assumed that the concomitancy is invariable, having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful, as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke in the mountain, a man {recollects the invariable attendance of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that "this mountain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended by fire." This is called *alinga paramarsa* which means the consideration of a sign. Thence is produced the knowledge that the "mountain is fiery," which is the conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for one's self.

But after, having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five numbered forms of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example (1) The mountain is fiery; (2) because it smokes (3) whatever

smokes ~~is fiery~~ as a culinary hearth ; (4) and this does so ; (5) therefore it is fiery as aforesaid. In consequence of token here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire.

The five members of this syllogism are severally named : (1) the proposition ; (2) the reason, (3) the example, (4) the application, and (5) the conclusion. The "mountain is fiery," is the proposition : "because of its being smoky," is the reason ; "Whatever is smoky etc." is the example ; "and so this mountain is," is the application ; "therefore the mountain is fiery" is the conclusion.

The cause of an inference (*anumity*), whether for one's self or for another, is simply the consideration of a sign ; therefore the *anumana* (which was previously stated to be the cause of an inference) is just this consideration of a sign.

A sign or token (*linga*) is of three sorts ; (1) that which may betoken by its presence or lay its absence (*amvayaryatireki*) ; (2) that which betokens only by its presence (*kevalanwayi*) ; and (3) that which betoken only by its absence (*kevalavyatirike*). The first is that token which is possessed of pervading inherence (*Vypti*), both in respect of its association (with the thing which it betokens), and its absence (when the thing it betokens is absent), as for example *smokeness* when *fire* is to be proved. When it is said ' where there is smoke there is fire, as on a culinary hearth,' we have a case of concomitant presence.

When it is said, "where is not, there smoke also is not, as in a great deep lake," we have a case of concomitant absence. The second is that token which has no negative instance as when it is said, "the jar is nameable because it is cognisable, as cloth is," there is no instance of nameableness or of cognizableness being, present where the other is absent, because every thing (that we can be conversant about) is both cognizable and nameable. The third is that token in regard to which we can reason only from its invariable absence. For example (we might argue as follows):

(1). Earth is different from these (other elements).

(2) Because it is odorous.

(3). Nothing that is not different from those (other elements) [is odorous—as water (for example, is not odorous) (4). But this (earth) is not odorous.

(5). Therefore it is different from the other elements. But if (in the third member of the arguments) we had argued (affirmatively) that "what possess odour is different from the other elements," we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing that of earth alone can that property be asserted.

That whose possession of what is to be established is doubtful is called ~~the~~ subject (*paksha*). as the mountain when the fact of its smoking is assigned as the reason (for inferring the presence of fire). That,

which ~~certainly~~ possesses the property in question, is called an instance on the same side (*sapaksha*), as the culinary hearth in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is called an instance on the opposite side (*Vipaksha*), as the great deep lake in the same example.

The five that merely present the appearance of a reason (*hetwabhasha*) are (1) that which would prove the contrary, (3) that where there is an equally strong argument on the other side, (4) unreal, and (5) the futile.

The alleged reason which goes astray (*savyabhi-chara*) is that which has not just the one conclusion. It is of three kinds (1). What would prove too much (*sadharana*); (2) what belongs to none besides the individual *asadharana*) and (3) the non-exclusive *anupasauhari*). The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is alleged as the proof may be present, whilst that which has to be proved absent:—as for instance, if one should say. "The mountain is fiery, because it is an object of right knowledge," the reason assigned would be liable to this objection) because the being an object that may be rightly known is predicable also of a lake, which is characterised by the absence of fire.

That (pretended token which belongs neither to any similar instance nor to any one dissimilar, is one devoid of commonity (*asadharana*), as when one says "sound is eternal for it has the nature of sound."

Now the nature of sound belongs to sound alone, and to nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal.

The pretended argument, which can bring an example neither in support nor in opposition is non-exclusive (*anupasauhari*). For example, should one say, "every thing is uneternal, because, it is cognizable," there would be no example to cite, because, "everything" leaving nothing over) is the subject of the conclusion.

A reason proving the reverse (*viruddha*) is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be proved. For example, suppose, one should say, "sound is eternal, because it is created," (we should reject his argument at once, because the fact of having been created implies non-eternity,—the negation of being eternal).

A counter-balanced reason (*satpratipaksha*) is that alone with which there exists another reason, which (equally well) establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue "sound is eternal, because it is audible, the nature of sound (by both parties admitted to be"; (it might be argued with equal force on the other side, that) "sound is non-eternal, because, it is a product, as jar is."

An unreal reason is three-fold,—(1) where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside (*asraya-siddha*); (2) where the nature alleged does not really reside in the subject (*swarupa siddha*); and (3)

where the ~~alleged~~ invariableness of concomitancy is not real (*Vyapyatwa siddha*).

(As an example of) the fallacy of non-existent locality (suppose that one argues). "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake"—here the sky-lotus is (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus), and in fact it (the sky-lotus) does not exist.

As (an example of) an argument where the nature does not really exist in the subject, (suppose one were to argue, "sound is a quality, because it is visible"—here (every one would perceive that) visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by hearing (not by vision).

A reason, when there is an indispensable condition is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. Such an indispensable condition (*upadhi*) is what always attends the property to be established, but does not always attend what is brought forward in proof.

Invariable attendance on the property to be established (*sadhyavyapakatwa*) consists in the not being the counter-entity (*apratiyogitwa*) of the absolute non-existence (*atyāntabhāva*) which has the same location as (*samanaadhikaran*) that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on what is brought forward in proof (*sadhanavyapakatwa*) consists in the being the counter-entity (*pratiyogitwa*) of the non-existence which has what is brought forward in proof.

(Suppose it to be argued that). "The mountain

must smoke, because it is fiery."—in this case the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. For "wherever that is smoke there is the conjunction of wet fuel," so that we have here invariable attendance on what is to be proved (*sadhyavyapakata*). But it is not true that "wherever is conjunction of wet fuel," for there is no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an (ignited) iron ball. So we have here non-invariable attendance on the proof (*sadhanavyapakata*). As there is thus its invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition for the sufficiency of the reason alleged. As it would require this additional condition (in order to prove that smoke must be present), fireiness (in the argument before us) is faulty as regards comprehensiveness.

An argument is futile (*badhita*) when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example, (it may be argued that), "Fire is cold, because it is a substance." There coldness is to be proved, and its opposite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the argument is futile.

Thus has Inference been expounded. Comparison or the recognition of likeness, (*upaman*) is the cause of an inference from similarity (*upamsti*). Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection

of the ~~purport~~ of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example a person, not knowing what is meant by the word *gavaya* (Bosgavaus), having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a *gavaya* is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind) that "this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*."

Thus has comparison been expounded.

A word (or right assertion) is the speech of one worthy (of confidence). One worthy is a speaker of the truth. A speech (or sentence) is a collection of significant sound: as, for example, "Bring the cow." A significant sound (*pada*) is that which is possessed of power (to convey a meaning). The power (of a word) is the appointment in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be recognisable from such and such a significant sound.

The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the interdependence, compatibility, and juxtaposition (of the word).

Interdependence (*akanksha*) means the inability in a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility (*Yogyata*) consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of the sentence). Juxtaposition consists in the

enunciation of the words without ~~a long~~ pause between each.

A collection of words devoid of interdependance, etc., is no valid sentence; for example "cow, horse, man, elephant," gives no information, the words not looking out for one another.

The expression. "He should irrigate with fire," is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation).

The words, "Bring-the-cow" not pronounced close together, but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of) juxtaposition.

Speech is of two kinds—temporal or profane (*laukika*), and sacred (*vaidika*). The former being uttered by God, is all authoritative; but the latter only, if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative; any other is not so.

The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbally communicated knowledge; its instrumental cause is language.

Thus has been explained what constitutes correct knowledge. Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts according to the division of doubt, mistake and, (such opinion as is open to) *reductio ad absurdum*.

The recognition, in one (and the same) thing possessing a certain nature of several heterogeneous

natures ~~characterizing~~ it, is doubt (*sansaya*). For example, "a post, or a man."

Apprehending falsely is a mistake (*viparyaya*). For example, in the case of mother of pearl, the idea that this is silver.

Reductio ad absurdum (*tarka*) consists in establishing the pervader (here supposed to be denied) through the allegation of the pervaded (here supposed to be granted). For example, "If there were not fire (which you deny,) then there would not be smoke (which you admit there is)."

Memory is also of two kinds—correct and incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect knowledge.

What all perceive to be agreeable is pleasure (*sukha*); what appears disagreeable is (*duḥkha*).

Desire (*ichchha*) means wishing. Aversion (*dweṣha*) means disliking. Effort, (*prayatna*) means action. Virtue or merit (*dharma*) arises from the performance of what is enjoined; but vice or demerit (*adharma*) from the performance of what is forbidden.

The eight qualities, Intellect and the rest—are distinctive of soul alone.

Intellect, desire, and effort are of two kinds;—eternal and transient; eternal in God, transient in mortals.

Quality, self-reproductive (*sadskara*) is of three

kinds—momentum, (*vega*) imagination and elasticity. Mommementum (*vega*) resides in the four beginning with Earth and in mind. Imagination (*vabana*) the cause of memory, and arising from motion, resides only in the Soul. Elasticity (*sthitisthapaka*) is that which restores to its former position what has been altered ; it resides in the mats and the like, former of the earthy element.

So much for the qualities.

Action consists in motion.

Casting upwards (*utkshepana*) is the cause of conjunction with a higher place Casting downwards (*apakshepana*) is the cause of conjunction with what is distant. Going (*gamana*) is the name of every other variety. Action resides only in the four beginning with earth and in mind.

Community or Genus (*samanya*) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in substance Quality, and Action. It is of two kinds—higher and lower The highest degree of community (or the *Sumnum* genus) is existence. A lower genus is such a one as substantiality (the common nature of what are called substances).

Differences (*visesha*) residing in eternal substances are excluders (of such from community of nature with the others).

Intimate relation (*Samavaya*) is constant connection. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are

those of which two the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and then thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, difference and eternal substances.

Antecedent non-existence (Pragabhava) is without beginning, and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction (Pradhwaṇsa) has a beginning and no end. (Such is non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence (Atyantabhava) is that the counter-entity whereof is considered independently of the three times (past, present and future). For example (such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that) there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence or difference (Anyonyabhava), is that the counter-entity whereof is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example (such difference is referred to when it is remarked that) a jar is not a web of cloth.

Since everything is properly included under the categories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories.

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